UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1994/798
6 July 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 2 JULY 1994 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

You will find attached hereto a letter from the French Government informing me of its intention to establish a humanitarian protection zone in south-west Rwanda in accordance with Security Council resolution 929 (1994) of 22 June 1994 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring this letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Annex

Letter dated 1 July 1994 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I received instructions this morning to inform you of the very grave concern on the part of the French authorities at the deterioration of the situation in Rwanda and the danger of a further humanitarian tragedy in that country.

In recent days, fighting has intensified outside the capital and is spreading to the south in the region of Butare, not far from the border with Burundi, and also to the west, apparently, in the direction of Kibuye. French units stationed in the region in implementation of Security Council resolution 929 (1994) of 22 June 1994 have already carried out reconnaissance operations in Butare. They have observed the influx of tens of thousands of inhabitants fleeing the fighting, adding to the several hundred thousand displaced persons in that part of the country. The continued fighting is creating a situation in south-west Rwanda that, in humanitarian terms, will quickly become completely uncontrollable. If steps are not taken to remedy the situation, that entire part of the country will be the scene of major outbreaks of violence, with the movement of hundreds of thousands of persons fleeing in complete desperation and with the danger of the physical elimination of the minorities in the area, which already arose during the months of April and May. There is reason to fear that all those persons will seek refuge in neighbouring countries, particularly Burundi, aggravating a situation whose precariousness you are already well aware of.

France considers it its responsibility to alert the international community through you in order to inform it about the situation, which requires an immediate cease-fire, as called for by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). A halt to the fighting is the only truly effective way to stabilize the humanitarian situation and open the way to a resumption of talks with the assistance of the countries of the region in order to bring about a political settlement on the basis of the Arusha Agreement, from which those responsible for the massacres and, in particular, acts of genocide must, of course, be excluded.

If a cease-fire cannot be brought about immediately, France will be faced with the following choice: to withdraw from Rwandan territory, while endeavouring to save human lives through ad hoc actions, which would be extremely difficult and limited; or to organize, on the basis of Security Council resolutions 925 (1994) of 8 June 1994 and 929 (1994), a safe humanitarian zone where the population would be protected from the fighting and its tragic consequences in Rwanda. The Franco-Senegalese forces would seek to ensure, within their mandate, that no activities threatening the security of the population in question were carried out within or from the zone. The zone would need to be centred on the region where the humanitarian problems are most acute and should be sufficiently large, in view of the number of persons involved, and contiguous, in order to stabilize the population in the area and facilitate the provision of humanitarian relief.

On the basis of information in our possession, the zone should comprise the districts of Cyangugu and Gikangoro and the southern half of the district of Kibuye, including the Kibuye-Gitarama road as far as the N'Daba pass.

France believes that, on the basis of resolutions 925 (1994) and 929 (1994), it is authorized to organize such a safe humanitarian zone. Nevertheless, it is the wish of France that, through you, the United Nations should indicate its support for the establishment of such a zone.

I wish to draw your attention once again to the urgent nature of the situation and emphasize that if France is unable to organize a safe humanitarian zone with the support of the international community, it will have no other choice than to withdraw very rapidly from Rwandan territory.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated to the members of the Security Council.

Jean-Bertrand MERIMEE

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S/1994/799
6 July 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 6 JULY 1994 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 2 July 1994 (S/1994/798) transmitting a communication from the Government of France has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jamsheed K. A. MARKER
President of the Security Council

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Security Council

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S/1994/800
7 July 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 JULY 1994 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to refer to your letter dated 24 May 1994 (S/1994/674) transmitting the final report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 780 (1992).

The members of the Security Council are grateful to the Commission of Experts for the work done in the discharge of its mandate. They have noted with appreciation that the database and all the other information gathered by the Commission in the course of its work have been forwarded to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal.

(Signed) Jamsheed K. A. MARKER
President of the Security Council

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General Assembly
Security Council

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A/49/218
S/1994/801
7 July 1994

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-ninth session
Items 103 and 104 (c) of the
preliminary list*
REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES,
QUESTIONS RELATING TO REFUGEES,
RETURNEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS
AND HUMANITARIAN QUESTIONS
HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS: HUMAN
RIGHTS SITUATIONS AND REPORTS OF
SPECIAL RAPPORTEURS AND
REPRESENTATIVES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Letter dated 6 July 1994 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a letter from Dr. Radoslav Bulajić, Deputy Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, addressed to you (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under items 103 and 104 (c) of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dragomir DJOKIĆ
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

* A/49/50/Rev.1.

ANNEX

Letter dated 29 June 1994 from the Deputy Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia addressed to the Secretary-General

The Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia wishes to inform you that the process of the ethnic cleansing of Serbs and discrimination against them vis-á-vis Muslims and Croats is being continued in the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia. As a consequence of the policy of ethnic cleansing, 707,368 Serbs had to leave their homes in those territories in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina in which the power of Bosnian Muslims and Croats was established. Considering the fact that there were 1,320,644 Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina (with 326,280 of those who declared themselves Yugoslavs) according to the 1981 census, about 50 per cent of the Serbs have been expelled from their homes and deprived of their property.

The process of ethnic cleansing in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, as in the Republic of Croatia before, was begun by the regular armed forces of the Republic of Croatia and paramilitary formations of Bosnian Croats (the first instances of the infiltration of the regular armed forces of the Republic of Croatia into the former Bosnia-Herzegovina began on 17 February 1992, whereupon they started the massacre and expulsion of the Serb population in the regions of Bosanska Posavina, western Herzegovina and the Kupres Plateau), which process was subsequently continued by armed formations of Bosnian Muslims.

The largest number of Serbs were expelled from Mostar (Serbs accounted for 30 per cent of the population of this town and were expelled in a joint action by Croatian and Muslim forces, which also destroyed all Orthodox churches and other places of worship of the Serb people in the region), other townships in western Herzegovina, and particularly from some regions in central Bosnia and Podrinje. Before the outbreak of the civil war in former Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbs accounted for 29 per cent of the population in the Goražde area and 30.1 per cent in Srebrenica; Serbs constituted a relative majority in the Sarajevo borough of Novi Grad; they accounted for about 20 per cent of the population of the Sarajevo borough of Stari Grad; between 20 per cent to 55 per cent in the following Sarajevo boroughs: Centar, Sarajevo-Ilidža and Sarajevo-Novo. Furthermore, a great number of Serbs and Yugoslavs (ever since the communist regime of the former Yugoslavia recognized Muslims as a separate people, Serbs were almost the only ones who declared themselves Yugoslavs) lived in Tuzla, 32.4 per cent, and Zenica, 28.4 per cent.

Out of 707,368 Serbs expelled from their homes, 427,368 found new homes in the Republic of Srpska (about 280,000 Serbs from the former Bosnia-Herzegovina live as refugees in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) as follows:

(a) The region of Herzegovina 1 (towns: Čajniče, Foča, Kalinovik, Rudo, Višegrad) - 34,176 Serbs expelled from other regions under Croatian-Muslim control;

(b) The region of Herzegovina 2 (towns: Bileća, Gacko, Konjic, Ljubinje, Nevesinje, Stolac, Trebinje) - 30,742;

(c) The region of north Bosnia (towns: Brod, Derventa, Doboj, Gračanica, Lukavac, Maglaj, Modriča, Odžak, Petrovo, Teslić, Tešanj, Zavidovići) - 54,501;

(d) The region of Krajina 1 (towns: Banja Luka, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Jajce) - 71,145;

(e) The region of Krajina 2 (towns: Bihać, Drvar, Glamoč, Grahovo, Ključ, Krupa na Uni, Kupres, Mrkonjić, Petrovac, Šipovo) - 46,171;

(f) The region of Sarajevo (towns: Sarajevo-Centar, Hadžići, Ilidža, Ilijaš, Rajlovac, Vogošća) - 52,164;

(g) The region of Birač (towns: Zvornik, Milići, Sekovići, Vlasenica) - 35,991;

(h) The region of Romanija (towns: Pale, Sokolac, Han Pijesak) - 39,039;

(i) The region of Semberija (towns: Bijeljina, Ugljevik, Brčko) - 62,989.

The Serbs remaining in the towns under Muslim control - Sarajevo, Zenica, Tuzla, Travnik and others - are the victims of ruthless discrimination. Not only do the Muslim authorities force them to participate in military operations against Serbs, particularly in digging trenches and cleaning mine fields (over 100 Serbs were executed for refusing to participate in Muslim armed formations or to dig tunnels under the Sarajevo airport and at other locations in Sarajevo), but also withhold humanitarian assistance from their quotas sent by Western and other countries. As Serbs are the most frequent victims of job dismissals and are thus left without means to support themselves, they have become virtual hostages whom Muslim authorities do not allow freely to leave the region.

One of the basic principles of democracy is the freedom of an individual to choose freely where he/she wants to live, especially if his/her existence is threatened in the environment in which he/she happens to live. The international community would therefore be well advised to establish the reasons why members of a certain nationality decide to leave regions under the control of one of the warring parties. In point of fact, even in conditions where there is no discrimination but where job opportunities are scarce as a result of economic difficulties, there does arise a need for economic emigration. For these reasons, the international community should exert maximum efforts to ensure full respect for the rights of all citizens, regardless of their religion or nationality, in the territories under the control of one of the warring parties in the civil war in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. One of these rights is the right of each individual to decide freely whether he/she wants to stay in the territory controlled by the authorities of the other party in the civil war.

In presenting these regrettable facts, the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs expresses its hope that a just and durable peace will soon be established in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, for without peace neither Serb nor Croatian and Muslim peoples can live in dignity.

(Signed) Dr. Radoslav BULAJIĆ
Deputy Federal Minister of
Foreign Affairs

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S/1994/802
7 July 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 JULY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SIERRA LEONE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement by the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone on the situation in Rwanda (see annex).

I would be grateful if you could have the present letter and the attached statement circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Alimamy Pallo BANGURA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Statement on the situation in Rwanda issued on 5 July 1994 by the Government of Sierra Leone

The Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone, through its delegation to the Thirtieth Summit Meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), held at Tunis from 13 to 15 June 1994, joined other African Governments represented at the Summit in adopting a resolution on the situation in Rwanda. By that resolution, African Governments expressed their strong condemnation of the massacres and systematic killings that were taking place in Rwanda and called upon the warring parties concerned to put an end to those heinous crimes, which were characterized as crimes against humanity. They also called for an immediate cessation of hostilities and the establishment of a cease-fire.

Notwithstanding this collective pronouncement by OAU, the human carnage in Rwanda has persisted, with innocent civilians as the primary target amidst a climate of ethnic hatred and fear.

This is the backdrop against which the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone views the involvement of the armed forces of the French Republic in Rwanda. Accordingly, Sierra Leone fully understands and appreciates the circumstances that prompted France's humanitarian intervention, the objective of which is to save innocent civilian life and property in Rwanda, and welcomes the declaration by the Government of France of the limited duration of its action.

The Government of Sierra Leone would like to avail itself of this opportunity to urge the warring parties to heed, without further delay, the terms of the OAU resolution. It would also like to urge the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, in collaboration with the countries of the region, to take all necessary measures to facilitate the quick and effective deployment of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) II with a view to ending the massacres and the hostilities and creating an environment conducive to the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

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S/1994/803
7 July 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN MOZAMBIQUE

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 916 (1994) of 5 May 1994 by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) for a final period until 15 November 1994, subject to the proviso that the Council would review the status of the mandate of ONUMOZ by 15 July 1994 based on a report by the Secretary-General, and also by 5 September 1994 based on a further report by the Secretary-General. As indicated in paragraph 55 of my last report to the Council (S/1994/511), the present report also elaborates upon the timetable for the closing of ONUMOZ and the withdrawal of the military and civilian personnel of the mission.

II. MAJOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS

A. General

2. Three and a half months remain before the holding of the first multi-party elections in Mozambique on 27 and 28 October 1994. The preparations for those elections are generally proceeding in accordance with the established timetable. Registration of voters began as scheduled on 1 June 1994 and is progressing satisfactorily.

3. Since my last report to the Council dated 28 April 1994, significant progress has been made in the Mozambican peace process. However, serious problems remain that must be addressed rapidly if the elections are to be held under acceptable conditions. The major concerns now are delays in the completion of the assembly and demobilization of troops belonging to the Government of Mozambique and the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO), as well as delays in the formation of the new Mozambican Defence Force (FADM).

B. Assembly and demobilization of troops

4. The Security Council, in its resolution 916 (1994) of 5 May 1994, urged the two Mozambican parties to meet the target dates of 1 June 1994 for the completion of the assembly of forces and 15 July 1994 for the completion of demobilization. While RENAMO accepted the deadlines, the Government declared that it would not be able to meet the target dates set by the Council but would conclude the assembly of its troops by 1 July and their demobilization by 15 August 1994.

5. It will be recalled that in November 1992 the Government had declared that it would send a total of 61,638 troops to its 29 assembly areas. At that time it also indicated that there would be an additional 14,767 soldiers who would be registered outside the assembly areas. The total of government soldiers would thus be 76,405. However, on 21 April 1994, the government delegation to the Cease-fire Commission presented revised and substantially lower figures, indicating that there would be a total of 64,110 government soldiers, 49,630 of whom would be sent to assembly areas and 14,480 of whom would be registered outside such areas. The Government claimed that the discrepancy was attributable to its failure to deduct from the initially estimated total a group of 13,776 soldiers who had been demobilized before the General Peace Agreement was signed. RENAMO did not, however, accept the new figures, and the matter was referred first to the Cease-fire Commission and then to the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission for verification and subsequent decision. On 17 June 1994, following protracted investigations and negotiations, the two parties signed a joint declaration accompanied by two separate statements. Based on the revised estimates, the new overall strength of the government troops was established at 64,466, of which 49,638 are to be registered in assembly areas and 14,828 outside assembly areas. RENAMO agreed to use the revised government figure as a working estimate and as a point of reference, on the condition that it would be verified by the Cease-fire Commission after the assembly of government troops was completed.

6. So far, despite the concerns expressed by my Special Representative and the international community, the assembly of the government troops has not been completed. The 1 July deadline which the Government set for itself has not been met. However, following a request from President Chissano, it has been agreed that 3,476 soldiers who were to be registered in the assembly areas will now be registered and demobilized in situ. As of 4 July 1994, the Government still had to assemble 4,517 troops. At the Government's request, ONUMOZ is providing transport to assembly areas for approximately 1,325 soldiers who are located in remote areas of the country. As of 4 July 1994, RENAMO had assembled 17,317 soldiers out of an expected total of 18,241; in a meeting of the Cease-fire Commission it was agreed that 899 RENAMO soldiers based at two locations would not go to the assembly areas but would be demobilized in situ. As of 4 July 1994, the Government had demobilized 22,832 soldiers (46 per cent of the expected total), while RENAMO had demobilized 5,138 soldiers (54 per cent of the expected total). A dramatic effort must now be made in order to complete the demobilization process by 15 August 1994.

7. Registration of government troops outside the assembly areas began only on 24 June. But as those soldiers are dispersed at approximately 140 separate

locations throughout the country, it is unlikely that their registration and demobilization can be completed by the 15 August deadline. In the meantime, registration of the 4,326 unassembled RENAMO troops began on 25 May and is expected to be concluded shortly. The demobilization of these troops is scheduled to be completed by 15 July.

8. Delays in demobilization and the selection of soldiers for FADM resulted in prolonged waiting periods in assembly areas and led to mounting frustration, demonstrations and rioting by the soldiers. In most cases, they demanded prompt demobilization and payment of salaries in arrears. On a number of occasions, United Nations personnel were attacked and threatened by the soldiers in assembly areas, while food and other supplies were frequently looted. As a precautionary measure, United Nations troops had to be deployed to or around cantonment sites. On 13 June 1994, the Cease-Fire Commission approved a plan providing for the closure of all 49 assembly areas, the transfer of all weapons to regional arms depots and the acceleration of the selection of soldiers for the new army. As of 4 July, one Government and three RENAMO assembly areas had already been closed.

9. As of 4 July 1994, a total of 74,858 weapons (59,213 Government and 15,645 RENAMO) had been collected from troops in assembly areas. To date, 87 per cent of the weapons collected have been transported to the regional arms depots. A total of 37,622 weapons out of 49,806 had been collected from the paramilitary forces. Some small caches of weapons have been found at various locations throughout the country. All recovered weapons have been duly registered and transferred to the regional arms depots.

10. On several occasions in the past (see S/1994/511, para. 25), I have indicated my concern with the security situation and the need to have additional United Nations infantry elements in some particularly vulnerable areas of the country. With the repatriation of the main body of the Italian infantry contingent from the central region of Mozambique, I have decided to deploy there in July a self-contained infantry company with a strength of up to 170 personnel, which will be provided by the Government of Brazil. I believe that their presence there will be very important, especially during the critical final stages of demobilization and preparation for the elections.

C. Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force

11. In resolution 916 (1994) the Security Council called upon the parties to ensure that the maximum possible number of soldiers were trained for the new Mozambican Defence Force before the elections. The Council also called upon the Government of Mozambique to provide logistical and technical support for the formation of FADM and to initiate the transfer of all central defence facilities to the FADM command. The Government is also responsible for providing regular remuneration to FADM troops.

12. According to the provisions of the general peace agreement, the new Mozambican army is to be composed of 30,000 soldiers, 15,000 from the Government and 15,000 from RENAMO. France, Portugal and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland agreed to assist the Mozambican Government in

training the new army. However, the present training programmes sponsored by the three participating States cover only some 15,000 soldiers. Because of problems encountered in the selection of soldiers for FADM, it now appears unlikely that training of the first group of 15,000 will be concluded by October 1994. As of 4 July 1994, just under 3,000 FADM soldiers had been trained under the above-mentioned programmes. These include the first three infantry battalions totalling 2,223 soldiers, special forces (350), marines (92), logistics and administration (150), and senior officers (100). Another 1,000 soldiers are currently being trained. In June, 131 Zimbabwean military instructors arrived in Mozambique to assist with infantry training, while Portugal has offered to train an additional 300 soldiers.

13. There are no provisions for training the remaining 15,000 soldiers for FADM. In my last report to the Council (S/1994/511, paras. 13-14) I outlined a number of options which would resolve the problem by phasing the formation of the new army. In my view, it would be preferable for the soldiers covered by the current programmes to be formed prior to the elections, and the second group thereafter. RENAMO is willing to accept this. The Government has put forward a counter-proposal that all 30,000 soldiers be recruited before the elections and half of them trained, while the remainder would be deployed in military centres where they would only receive basic training before the elections. However, in order to realize this option, additional instructors would be needed to assist the Government. Considerable financial resources would also be required to rehabilitate the military centres and to organize the basic training before the end of October. It is doubtful whether the Government could finance and carry out such a programme within the required time-frame. The Government of Italy has been requested to provide assistance in the formation of FADM. While the Government of Italy has undertaken a survey of the possible requirements, it has not as yet formally reacted to the request from the Government of Mozambique.

D. Cease-fire

14. During the period under review the cease-fire has been generally respected and military activities did not pose a serious threat either to the peace process or to preparations for the forthcoming elections. A total of four formal complaints were reported to the Cease-fire Commission, all of which are under consideration by the Commission. Three of the cases involve alleged irregularities in the cantonment process. In one case, RENAMO complained about double registration of government soldiers. As a result, the ONUMOZ Technical Unit's data bank has been adjusted to double-check each soldier registered against all soldiers already demobilized. A cross-check found that 260 soldiers had attempted double registration. The Commission is currently deliberating on how to proceed with those cases. The Government lodged two complaints alleging that 89 RENAMO soldiers had left the Lurio assembly area for hostile purposes and that demobilized RENAMO soldiers from the Chinanguanine assembly area had been ordered to return to their former base. A RENAMO allegation that government forces are undergoing military training in the United Republic of Tanzania has been investigated and the report is currently under review by the Commission.

15. In paragraph 17 of my last report to the Council (S/1994/511), I expressed my concern over the unwillingness of the parties to allow the United Nations to reconnoitre certain military bases and to provide ONUMOZ with complete lists of military equipment. Since then, access has been granted to all military installations designated as locations for unassembled troops. However, the parties have yet to provide the United Nations with updated lists of their military equipment. The general peace agreement provides that biweekly updates of these lists should be presented to the Cease-fire Commission, but the latest submission from both parties was provided in August 1993.

III. PREPARATION FOR THE ELECTIONS

16. During the last periodic review the Security Council welcomed the announcement by the President of Mozambique that elections would take place on 27 and 28 October 1994. The Council further reiterated the importance it attached to the elections taking place on these dates, with electoral registration commencing on 1 June 1994.

17. In the October elections, voters will elect both the President of the Republic and the members of the national assembly. The Electoral Law prescribes that the President must be elected by an absolute majority, otherwise a run-off election must be held between the two candidates who received the largest number of votes. The run-off elections must take place between the seventh and the twenty-first day after the publication of the results of the initial ballot, which is to be no later than two weeks after the poll. The term of office for the President and the 250 members of the National Assembly is five years. The National Elections Commission will determine the number of deputies to be elected to the Assembly from each district in proportion to the number of voters registered.

18. The National Elections Commission is the principal body overseeing the electoral process and is assisted in the practical execution of its mandate by the Technical Secretariat for the Administration of the Elections. Provincial and district Elections Commissions and local offices of the Technical Secretariat are now established in all but a few of the 138 provincial districts as well as in the 6 electoral districts which have been established in Maputo. The Electoral Law stipulates that the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), RENAMO and other political parties must be represented in all electoral bodies. However, as a result of internal staffing problems, the representation of RENAMO and other parties is low or non-existent in several districts; the transparency of the electoral process could suffer if this under-representation is not corrected.

19. The overall institutional framework for the elections was completed on 8 June 1994 with the swearing in of the national and international judges for the Electoral Tribunal. The Tribunal will function as a court of appeal against decisions of the National Elections Commission.

20. Training of all electoral elements, voter registration teams and civic education agents was coordinated by the National Elections Commission with technical assistance from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and

was concluded at the end of May. Registration of voters began as scheduled on 1 June 1994 and is advancing relatively smoothly. At this stage, approximately 1,500 out of the initially envisaged 1,600 registration teams are fully operational. As of 4 July, at least 2.5 million out of a projected 8 million eligible voters had registered. This has been achieved in spite of significant logistical bottlenecks. Voter registration is scheduled to last 10 weeks but may be extended on an exceptional basis by the National Elections Commission until 12 September 1994, when the electoral campaign is to begin.

21. In paragraph 51 of my last report to the Council (S/1994/511), I expressed my conviction that free and fair elections in Mozambique are possible subject to certain conditions which, I wish to reiterate, are essential to the electoral process. In this context, I have noted with concern that access to a few RENAMO-controlled districts is still impeded. Furthermore, clear rules for access to State mass media, including both radio and television, have yet to be established. As of 4 July 1994, a total of 15 political parties had registered and were participating in the electoral process. RENAMO has not yet officially registered but is participating in the process as a party to the general peace agreement.

22. In my last report, I apprised the Security Council of the situation regarding technical assistance funding for the electoral process and the downward revision of the original budget from US$ 71 million to US$ 59 million. This budget has now been further reduced to $56.3 million. Total pledges towards the election budget now total $52.5 million, including $3.3 million set aside by the Government from the State budget. This leaves a shortfall of $3.8 million. I reiterate my appeal to donors to bridge this gap and urgently honour their earlier commitments in order that preparations for the elections may proceed on schedule. In the meantime, the Mozambican political parties have continuously stressed the need for funds to prepare for the electoral campaign. To date, donors have pledged a total of $3.54 million for the trust fund established to assist registered parties, on the condition that the National Elections Commission establish rules of procedure and eligibility criteria for the fund. After long delays, the Commission agreed on 28 June 1994 to formulate such criteria.

23. Pursuant to its mandate, the Electoral Division of ONUMOZ is monitoring the entire electoral process; its 148 officers are stationed in provinces and districts as well as in Maputo. Monitoring activities cover voter registration, civic education campaigns, use of the press and activities of political parties and their leaders before and during the electoral campaign. United Nations electoral officers frequently visit and check registration sites and conduct sample counts of registered voters. They also receive complaints from political parties and individuals concerning alleged irregularities in the electoral process. While all complaints are transmitted to the National Elections Commission for follow-up, ONUMOZ is mandated to carry out separate investigations. During the elections on 27 and 28 October, several hundred additional international observers are expected to monitor the polling and the counting of votes throughout the country. A total of 60,000 Mozambican polling officers are to be trained by the National Elections Commission, with assistance from UNDP.

IV. POLICE ACTIVITIES

24. Of the authorized strength of 1,144 United Nations police observers, 817 had been deployed by 4 July, in accordance with the schedule set out in my last report to the Council of 28 April 1994 (S/1994/511). To date, 29 CIVPOL stations have been established outside provincial and district capitals; 8 of them are in RENAMO-controlled areas. An additional 31 stations are scheduled to open as soon as logistical arrangements are in place. Logistical problems have delayed the establishment of CIVPOL outposts in some areas.

25. The initial reluctance on the part of the authorities of the two parties to cooperate with ONUMOZ civilian police is gradually being overcome. CIVPOL initially encountered difficulties in gaining access to a number of government police stations and was unable to inspect the Quick Reaction Force systematically. Following several discussions with the Minister of the Interior, however, access to the Quick Reaction Force has been granted. Since then, CIVPOL has been given information on the organization, strength, equipment and training of that force.

26. As part of the agreement of 3 September 1993 on the unification of the territorial administration of Mozambique, the two parties decided that the Mozambican police should re-establish posts in areas formerly controlled by RENAMO. RENAMO's political leaders have continuously declared that they would guarantee access to all areas that were under their control, while the national police continues to reiterate its commitment to set up the required posts. However, these commitments have often not been acted upon: in some cases, local RENAMO authorities have denied the government police access, while the latter appears reluctant to extend its posts to former RENAMO areas. This situation is hindering the effective functioning of CIVPOL.

27. ONUMOZ has so far received 47 complaints of misconduct by members of the national police. Thirty-five cases were investigated and fully resolved, while 12 cases are still under investigation. The cases fall mainly into three categories: (a) illegal detention of civilians; (b) abuse of detainees' civil rights; and (c) criminal investigations involving possible political motives. Furthermore, many detainees have complained about the lack of food, water and other necessities in State prisons.

V. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME

28. The coordination of assistance to be provided from now to the end of the year to meet the demands of the humanitarian situation in Mozambique is among the current and major preoccupations of the United Nations. Against the background of the demobilization process and in the light of the continuing return of significant numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons to rural areas, mine-clearance activities as well as agricultural production have also become critical factors in the humanitarian situation. Consequently, the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (UNOHAC) of ONUMOZ is now focusing on activities that will effectively address the current situation in a comprehensive manner. Special emphasis is being placed on the implementation of programmes and activities aimed at ensuring the full

reintegration and resettlement of returnees and internally displaced persons and demobilizing soldiers within Mozambican society.

29. With the recent completion of the review of the consolidated humanitarian assistance programme, a clearer picture of humanitarian needs for the period from May to December 1994 and related costs has emerged. The provision and distribution of emergency relief in the form of food and non-food items to the various categories of beneficiaries is estimated at US$ 117 million. This covers the distribution of seeds and tools as well as costs related to emergency work in the areas of water supply and health and education in support of overall reintegration programmes in rural areas.

30. For activities related to the repatriation of refugees and the rehabilitation of areas with a large returnee population, an estimated $31 million is required. To date, some 800,000 Mozambican refugees have returned. An additional flow of returnees, estimated at 600,000, is expected before the end of 1994.

31. The reintegration support scheme for demobilized soldiers includes the extension of six months severance pay from the Government for a further 18 months. With the Government's decision, taken on 23 June 1994, to grant pensions to disabled RENAMO soldiers, the reintegration support scheme was ratified by the Supervising and Monitoring Commission on 24 June 1994. The scheme, together with a programme for training, counselling and job referral to facilitate the re-entry of demobilized soldiers into civilian life, has been established at a cost of $47 million.

32. Although this season's harvest is projected to be better than last season's, the expected reduction in the provision of food relief is smaller than had been hoped for. The increase in areas planted in 1993-1994 as a direct consequence of the cease-fire was countered by inadequate rains and pest infestations, as well as by the scale of destruction caused by cyclone "Nadia" in the northern provinces of the country. The recent Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)/World Food Programme (WFP) crop and food supply assessment mission has estimated that total cereal imports required during the period from May 1994 to April 1995 will be 600,000 metric tons, which represents a reduction of over 300,000 metric tons from the previous agricultural year.

33. In my last report, I indicated that the implementation of the United Nations mine-clearance programme would be accelerated following delays experienced in its initial phase. The plan to establish a national mine-clearance capacity is now making progress, and it is expected that some 400 Mozambican de-miners will be trained by November 1994. In this regard, the Mine Clearance Training Centre is to be moved from temporary facilities in Beira to more permanent ones in Tete. In the meantime, the national mine survey was completed on 9 June 1994, providing critical details concerning safety of roads and 1,300 confirmed or suspected mined sites. Clearance of 40 kilometres of road in Sofala Province, from Sena to Chiramba, has been completed under a contract with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Through a project financed by the United Kingdom, three teams of 68 Mozambican mine clearers are working on the clearance of priority roads in Zambezia. Also,

Norwegian People's Aid continues its work in the provinces of Tete and Sofala, having completed the opening of a key route in Zambezia, providing access to an area that has been isolated for many years. That organization, together with a group of 100 mine clearers, is also currently engaged in mine-clearance activities within Maputo province.

34. While persistent efforts will be made to move the humanitarian endeavour in Mozambique towards rehabilitation and reconstruction, the assessment of needs for the period between now and December 1994 indicates the existence of significant emergency-type humanitarian requirements. In this connection, it should be borne in mind that the flow of returnees will continue beyond December 1994, as will other humanitarian programmes, such as mine clearance and the reintegration of demobilized soldiers. At present, UNOHAC is working closely with the Government and RENAMO in order to ensure the sustainability of progress achieved and the coordination of externally funded humanitarian assistance programmes after the elections.

VI. TIMETABLE FOR THE CLOSURE OF ONUMOZ AND WITHDRAWAL OF CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PERSONNEL

35. By paragraph 19 of resolution 916 (1994), the Security Council extended the mandate of ONUMOZ for a final period until 15 November 1994 at the strength described in paragraphs 22, 24 and 25 of my last report (S/1994/511). The withdrawal of ONUMOZ civilian and military personnel is scheduled to begin immediately after the elections on 27 and 28 October 1994 and is scheduled to be concluded before the end of January 1995.

36. Several hundred international electoral observers who are due to arrive in Mozambique approximately 10 days before the October elections are scheduled to be repatriated almost immediately after the poll. The majority of the international staff of the ONUMOZ Electoral Division and the United Nations Volunteers will leave the mission area after the election results are published. Meanwhile, the withdrawal of ONUMOZ police observers is planned to take place in three phases beginning on 10 November 1994 and ending by mid-December, when the last 200 observers from the regional and central headquarters will be repatriated. The withdrawal of the humanitarian component of ONUMOZ is also planned to begin immediately after the elections, with most of the staff of UNOHAC scheduled to leave the mission area by mid-November. A limited number of personnel will remain until the end of November 1994 for handing over activities.

37. The drawdown of the ONUMOZ military component will start on 15 November 1994 and be concluded within 40 days. Preparations for repatriation of each of the major national contingents will take approximately two to three weeks to accomplish; this process will be initiated on 1 November 1994. The tentative withdrawal schedule of infantry units is as follows: the Uruguayan contingent will depart in the period from 18 to 26 November 1994; the Brazilian on 22 and 23 November 1994; the Botswanan on 4 and 5 December 1994; the Bangladeshi from 25 November to 11 December; and the Zambian in the second half of December 1994. The repatriation of military support units and medical personnel is scheduled to begin on 19 November 1994 and to be completed by

22 December 1994. Until the closure of the mission by the end of January 1995, only a limited number of mostly civilian logisticians and of essential military personnel (specialists and staff officers) would remain in Mozambique.

38. This recommended timetable for withdrawal of personnel is based on the relevant provisions of the general peace agreement. The presence of ONUMOZ would be required until such time as the new Government takes office. The withdrawal plan is thus conditional upon: (a) the successful holding of peaceful, free and fair elections on 27 and 28 October 1994; (b) the announcement of the election results no later than 12 November 1994; and (c) the timely establishment of a new Government. Should a second ballot be required for the election of the President, it might be necessary for the Council to adjust the timetable for the withdrawal of certain elements of ONUMOZ.

VII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

39. As indicated in my report to the General Assembly of 23 May 1994 (A/48/849/Add.1), the estimated financial requirements of ONUMOZ for the period from 1 May to 15 November 1994 amounted to $178,770,900 (gross) and $175,500,100 (net). The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, in its report of 24 June 1994 (A/48/956), recommended appropriation and assessment of an additional amount of $111.5 million (gross) for the period from 1 May to 15 November 1994, taking into account the amount of $53.8 million already appropriated and assessed. However, for the period from inception to 30 June 1994 there are still outstanding assessed contributions for ONUMOZ totalling $153.2 million. As of 30 June 1994, the total amount of outstanding assessed contributions for all peace-keeping operations is $2,100.0 million.

VIII. OBSERVATIONS

40. With the election dates of 27 and 28 October 1994 rapidly approaching, the timetable for the peace process is becoming increasingly tight. While significant progress has been made in many areas, and especially in the electoral sphere, I am concerned by the delays in the assembly and demobilization of troops and in the training and formation of the new army.

41. Both parties to the general peace agreement have repeatedly reiterated their commitment to ensure the conclusion of the demobilization process by the agreed deadlines, but these assurances have not yet been fully translated into action. It is now imperative that the assembly and demobilization of government troops be accelerated dramatically if the established and recently reconfirmed deadline is to be met. If the demobilization of government and RENAMO troops is not completed by the agreed dates, and if a large number of the soldiers selected for FADM are left in assembly areas, there is a danger that three armies will be in existence in Mozambique during the election period. This could pose a serious threat to stability and thus to the holding of free and fair elections and the peaceful formation of the new government. It is therefore imperative that everything possible be done by the parties to speed up the demobilization process.

UNITED
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Security Council

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S/1994/804
7 July 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 JULY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF YEMEN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to enclose herewith a statement by the Acting Prime Minister of the Republic of Yemen, H.E. Dr. Mohamed Saed Al-Attar, concerning the situation in Yemen.

I would appreciate it if the enclosed statement be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdalla S. AL-ASHTAL
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

[Original: Arabic]

1. After the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 924 (1994), of 1 June 1994, on the situation in the Republic of Yemen, which was followed by resolution 931 (1994), of 29 June 1994, the Government of the Republic of Yemen declared a unilateral cease-fire on eight consecutive occasions, but the rebels continued to reject it through their actions since they continued to bombard by land, sea and air the forces of unity and legality.

2. This uninterrupted violation has imposed a tragic situation on the innocent population of Aden and other cities, which is still exposed to the dangers arising from the continuation of military operations, not to mention the lack of water and other vital necessities.

3. For these reasons and in order to protect persons and their property and put an end to their suffering and the rebel operations, which have continued to threaten national security and the lives of the population, the Government decided to restore and exercise its authority in all areas of the country. Since this has been achieved, the Government of the Republic of Yemen declares and affirms that all military operations will cease definitively and immediately, as a result of which the provisions of Security Council resolutions 924 (1994) and 931 (1994) will be implemented.

4. The Government forces have distributed and are continuing to distribute food and water to the population of Aden and other places in the areas that have suffered the most as a result of control by the rebels.

In view of the foregoing, the Government of the Republic of Yemen wishes to inform you that it has decided to:

(a) Declare a general and complete amnesty;

(b) State its readiness to compensate all those who have lost property as a result of the rebel operations and to consider that the law protecting the families of martyrs will apply to all the victims of the rebellion;

(c) Reaffirm its strong commitment to ensuring democratic order, political pluralism, freedom of opinion and the press and respect for human rights;

(d) Uphold its commitment to the continuation of the national dialogue on the basis of constitutional legality and to compliance with the provisions of the document of commitment and agreement as a basis for building the modern Yemeni State;

(e) Reaffirm its intention to engage in full cooperation with the States of the region on the basis of the principles of mutual respect, good neighbourliness and non-interference in internal affairs, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and also to be ready to develop relations of

close cooperation with its neighbours in order to promote the security, stability and welfare of the population of the Arabian peninsula and the Gulf.

In conclusion, I wish to express my deepest gratitude to you and your Special Envoy, Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, for the efforts that you have made in order to settle the internal crisis that our country has undergone. I also wish to express appreciation, through you, to the President and members of the Security Council and assure you once again of our complete cooperation with them and the Council in order to promote the stability and security of our country and the entire region.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Mohamed Saed AL-ATTAR
Acting Prime Minister of the Republic of Yemen

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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S/1994/805
8 July 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 808 (1993) of 22 February 1993 and 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993,

Having regard to Article 16 (4) of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (S/25704),

Having considered the nomination by the Secretary-General of Mr. Richard J. Goldstone for the position of Prosecutor of the International Tribunal,

Appoints Mr. Richard J. Goldstone as Prosecutor of the International Tribunal.

94-27921 (E) 080794 10/07/94

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Security Council

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S/1994/806
9 July 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 JULY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF MOZAMBIQUE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to enclose herewith for your consideration, an unofficial translation of the statement by the Head of the Government Delegation to the Cease-Fire Commission (CCF) during its meeting held at Maputo on 4 July 1994, regarding the ongoing peace process in Mozambique.

I would appreciate if you could have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Pedro Comissario AFONSO
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative to the United Nations

Annex

Position of the Government of Mozambique regarding the cantonment of troops

"On 4 July 1994, we concluded the cantonment process, with the arrival of the remaining FAM-FPLM troops in the 29 designated assembly areas. There are, however, still 1,325 soldiers and 19 tons of materiel whose transportation has been requested to, but not yet granted by ONUMOZ.

It should be noted that about 3,814 soldiers will remain in their respective barracks, in order to protect military instalations and infrastructure. Under the existing agreements within the Cease-Fire Commission (CCF), these soldiers are considered as part of the number already cantoned in the assembly areas and whose registration is underway.

As we announce the practical conclusion of the cantonment of Government troops, we deem it appropriate to formally bring to the attention of the CCF some legitimate Government concerns regarding this process.

Until now, the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) has exerted considerable, unilateral pressure on the Government for the cantonment of its troops -- both through the media and the Security Council -- but it has failed to do the same thing with regard to Renamo.

On the contary, ONUMOZ stated that Renamo had concluded its cantonment operations, in contradiction with information contained in its daily reports,which clearly indicates that Renamo has a considerable number of troops still to be sent to the assembly areas.

The Government deems it necessary that ONUMOZ act with objectivity, avoiding any kind of partiality that might discredit and jeopardize the implementation of the General Peace Agreement, and ultimately the whole peace process.

The cease-fire violations by Renamo, which have been duly reported by the Government, are a source of great concern. The CCF not only failed to make a final ruling about these violations, but it has also downplayed the seriousness of the incidents by neglecting to make any effort to investigate them. Following such incidents have been duly reported by the Government:

- The presence of a Renamo battalion in Pandambire;

- Training of soldiers in Gorongosa;

- Movement of a Renamo batallion from Maringue to Buzua, south of Marromeu.

We must express our concern over the fact that an investigation is yet to be initiated -- and is long overdue -- into the matter of the reassembly of Renamo demobilized soldiers in Ngungwe, inspite of a decision already taken in that regard.

About 500 armed Renamo soldiers have been blocking the road linking Mutarara to Cambulatsitsi, demanding food supplies from ONUMOZ. If, as ONUMOZ has indicated, Renamo has already cantoned all of its forces in the assembly areas, where do these 500 soldiers come from? How come ONUMOZ is dealing with them without first demanding their cantonment? Isn't this a case of logistical support by ONUMOZ to underground Renamo forces?

In November 1992, Renamo had announced that the number of its troops to be sent to the 20 assembly areas reserved for them, was 21,000 men. When we initiated the cantonment process, in November 1993, the ONUMOZ daily reports on the movement of troops stated that the number of Renamo soldiers that were to be sent to these areas was 19,140. According to recent daily reports, however, the total number of soldiers to be taken to the assembly areas is now 18,241.

We wonder in which sessions of the CCF were such changes in the total number of Renamo soldiers communicated. Which is in fact, the total number of Renamo soldiers? How many of them will remain in the centres for non-assembled troops?

We have not been informed of any of that, and apparently, ONUMOZ is not concerned about this. ONUMOZ is acting as if its mission was to control and demand everything from the Government, and not to monitor the implementation of the General Peace Agreement by the parties.

We would like to repeat that making unilateral demands and putting substantial pressure on the Government, while ignoring Renamo's non-compliance, can seriously jeopardize the peace process.

The Government demands that an end be put to this kind of tolerant behavior, and hopes that ONUMOZ will exert equal pressure on Renamo for the cantonment and demobilization of its soldiers.

The Government Delegation to the Cease-Fire Commission has clear and precise instructions to seek a quick investigation and clarification of the matters that have already been notified to this body, as well as of the new facts presented in this statement. To accomplish this, we are willing to make all the necessary efforts within the framework of the CCF.

Maputo, 4 July 1994".

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8 July 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE CREDENTIALS OF THE DEPUTY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a note verbale dated 7 July 1994 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations stating that Mr. David E. Birenbaum has been appointed deputy representative of the United States on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, this letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

94-28021 (E) 090794 10/07/94

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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S/1994/808
8 July 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE CREDENTIALS OF THE ALTERNATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 7 July 1994, from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations stating that Ms. Jill Barrett has been appointed alternate representative of the United Kingdom on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, the above letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

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9 July 1994

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LETTER DATED 8 JULY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to present to you the attached article from the Times of London, dated 7 July 1994.

May I ask you for your kind assistance in circulating this article as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador and Permanent Representative

Annex

THE TIMES THURSDAY JULY 7 1994

UN protects Serb image abroad by veiling misdeeds

FROM JOEL BRAND IN SARAJEVO

THE United Nations mission in Bosnia has deliberately withheld information which, in its view, would be damaging to the public image of the Bosnian Serbs, interviews with several UN officials and officers have disclosed.

Recent incidents have highlighted what amounts to a UN policy partly to shield the Serbs from further international condemnation. Taken as a whole, the incidents show a pro-Serb bias in statements by the UN and raise questions about its credibility. The incidents include the way in which the UN reacted to the killing of a British soldier by Serbs ten days ago.

The most recent occurrence involved a UN helicopter fired on and hit by Serbs, north of Sarajevo, on Tuesday. A single bullet pierced the cockpit and damaged the French aircraft's radio. Serb authorities are refusing to grant permission for UN helicopter flights over parts of the country they control and have threatened to shoot down aircraft violating the ban. A UN official said yesterday that there was no indication which side fired on the white-painted aircraft. However, another UN officer said privately that the attack clearly came from the Serb side of the front line.

In the case of the British soldier shot dead by Serbs in Gorazde on June 26, a UN official said the attack was played down because of who fired the shot.

"If the Bosnian army had killed that soldier, the UN would have made a big deal about it," the official said. "But because it was the Serbs, not much was really said. It is not just or right, but the way the UN seeks to solve this is to follow the easiest path and that means the Serbs win."

Serb terrorism against Muslim and Croat civilians in northern Bosnia, many of them elderly, has also gone largely unannounced by UN officials, including Monday's assault on a group of non-Serbs outside a UN relief agency's office in Banja Luka.

During the Serb assault on Gorazde in April, Western countries, including Britain, were aware that Yugoslav army troops and tanks played key roles, but they withheld the information. One tactic of Western governments, unwilling to back the Bosnian government with military force, has been to describe the conflict as a civil war and play down the involvement of Croatia and Serbia.

The Bosnian army and the Croats are to ask the UN to return their impounded arms, it was announced yesterday. The weapons are now needed to fight the Serbs.

Yesterday the Serb and Muslim-led armies launched fresh shelling attacks in north-central Bosnia as their leaders considered a peace plan backed by Western and Russian mediators. The plan, drawn up by America, Russia, Germany, France and Britain, drew a cautious response from the Serbs while President Izetbegovic said his government would probably support the plan.

London: Serb and Muslim leaders yesterday sharply attacked the international Geneva peace plan, but did not reject it outright (Michael Binyon writes). Haris Silajdzic, the Bosnian Prime Minister, said it had "serious deficiencies" and Radovan Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb leader, called it an "American diktat".